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Abstract. Although polygamy is common in many parts of the world, 
most economic analysis of the household focuses on monogamy. We use 
simple public good games to investigate experimentally theories of 
household behavior.  A unique aspect of our research is that half our 
sample are polygynous households recruited systematically from 
villages in rural areas south of Kano, Northern Nigeria, one of the 
modern heartlands of polygyny. Spouses play two variants of a 
voluntary contributions game in which endowments are private 
knowledge, but contributions are public. In one variant, the common 
pool is split equally. In the other treatment the husband allocates the 
pool (and wives are forewarned of this). Most partners keep back at 
least half of their endowment from the common pool, but we find no 
evidence that polygynous households are less efficient than their 
monogamous counterparts. We reject a strong form of Bergstrom’s 
model of polygyny in which all wives receive an equal allocation. Senior 
wives often receive more from their husbands, no matter what their 
contribution. Thus their return to contributions is higher compared to 
their junior counterparts. However, the clearest result is that when they 
control the allocation, polygynous men receive a higher payoff 
compared to both their wives and their monogamous counterparts. 
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I. Introduction.* 
Polygamy is a familiar and apparently robust social institution, found in 85% of 
cultures (Henrich et al, 2012) across many nations and around the world. Its most 
typical form is polygyny, where a husband has two or more wives, and in this form its 
incidence is significant in more than 50 countries (Tertilt, 2005, Jacoby, 1995).i  
Though widespread and seemingly integral to the economy of many societies, the 
empirical investigation of intra-household behavior in polygyny has attracted 
comparatively little attention; the evidence we have tends to be sparse and often 
contradictory. Take for example whether polygynous households are efficient. it 
might be suspected that free-riding and destructive rivalry between competing wives 
hampers efficiency in polygynous households, (see for example Strassmann, 1997) 
but there is a lack of clear evidence on whether this is actually the case (Mammen, 
2004). Meanwhile, there are, competing views on the allocation of resources within 
polygynous families in Islamic sub-Saharan Africa, with some writers arguing that 
Koranic injunctions mean that wives are treated equally (Solivetti, 1994), while others 
conclude that senior wives obtain more (Ware, 1979) or that it is wives with children 
who receive greater resources. (Izugbara and Ezeh, 2010).  
In this paper we take the research in a new direction, by reporting a lab-in-the-field 
experiment with polygynous spouses in a northern part of Nigeria, the country with 
the highest recorded number of such families. Given the lack of pre-existing data, we 
concentrate on some simple hypotheses. As with monogamous families, the most 
straightforward questions to consider with polygyny concern household efficiency 
and intra-household allocation. Are monogamous households more efficient than 
polygamous– in the sense of coming closer to maximizing household surplus? In 
polygynous households, which wife receives the greater share of incomes? How are 
resources allocated?  These questions provide a starting point for our design which 
employs two versions of a one-shot voluntary contribution game: one with a fixed 
rule of allocating the communal pool and one in which the husband must make the 
allocation. In addition, we run a follow-up household survey 1-2 months later, in 
which wives and husbands are interviewed separately. In this way, we tie our 
experimental results to more traditional forms of household data. To offer a preview 
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of our results, broadly speaking we find that both types of households in our sample 
are equally inefficient in their decisions – there is no efficiency penalty or bonus for 
polygyny. In terms of payoffs, senior wives in polygyny fare no worse than wives in 
monogamous households, but polygynous husbands do better than their monogamous 
counterparts. Most clearly, second wives are disadvantaged compared to their co-
spouses when men control the allocation of resources.  
 
II. Background 
Although polygyny is common and its prevalence has been negatively linked with 
economic development (Tertilt, 2005), interest in it from an economic perspective has 
been intermittent and economic theories about behavior within such households are 
correspondingly rare (see Fenske 2015 for an excellent overview). Most attention has 
been paid to the conditions under which polygyny is an equilibrium outcome in the 
marriage market (e.g. Grossbard, 1978). For instance, Becker’s (1974 and 1991) 
pioneering discussion, variation in male productivity is given as one possible reason 
for polygyny. Total output may be higher when more than one female is matched with 
some males, compared to a situation where only monogamy matches are allowed. 
Given such efficiency and a competitive marriage market, polygyny may result 
Against this, Becker 1991 raises the possibility of diminishing returns to scale in 
polygyny because one input (the husband) is fixed. Significant diseconomies might 
also arise through free-riding in the provision of household public goods or through 
the constant and destructive rivalry between wives regularly described in qualitative 
interviews with polygynous families (e.g. Solivetti, 1994 or Strassmann, 1997). 
Mammen, 2004, for example considers a data set on child mortality for Cote d’Ivoire 
(see also Kazianga, and Klonner, 2009 for neighbouring Mali), and concludes that 
intrahousehold competition for resources may lead to inefficient investment in the 
household’s children. Against this picture of rivalry and mutual distrust, there may be 
some significant economies of scale in marriage size, such as through the division of 
labor. After all, in standard economic models of the marriage market, it is this 
division that helps drive the efficiency advantages of marriage over singlehood, and it 
would seem quite reasonable to suppose that there are continued gains from greater 
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household size.  Either way it would be useful to have some comparative evidence on 
the relative efficiency of intra-household decisions. 
Perhaps the most complete microeconomic model of the allocation of resources 
within polygyny is provided in Bergstrom’s (1994) well-known though unpublished 
paper. He supposes that for women there are first increasing then decreasing returns to 
scale in the production of children, f (see Figure 1 where rˆ  represents a turning point 
above which the function is concave) from the investment of resources, r. Given a low 
enough turning point in the production function, it is then optimal for a husband who 
cares only about his own consumption and the number of his surviving children to 
marry more than one wife and then allocate resources equally to the spouses when 
child productivity is symmetric.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Formally, consider a husband with income Y who must divide it between his own 
consumption and investments, r1 and r2 in the production of children from his two 
families. He maximizes the payoff function, 
)()()( 2121 rfrfrrYu   
Where u(.) is his utility from personal consumption. The first order conditions 
yield: 
)()( 21 rfrf   
Where ′ indicates a first derivative. If all functions are concave (or have low enough 
turning points), then at the maximum r1 = r2. That is, the husband allocates equal 
funds to the two families and produces equal numbers of children, f(r1)=f(r2). 
Consequently in any increment in income the wives receive equal shares. 
We view this theory as a useful organizing device and provider of a simple null 
hypothesis in what follows, but it comes from a deliberately simple and naïve model 
(Bergstrom describes it as ‘a crude caricature of the reality of polygamous marriage 
markets’ which is probably overstating the point). As the author, says, though, 
“Because the structure is simple and easily understood, it should be quite possible to 
test it in applications” (p. 18 Bergstrom, 1994) and that is the spirit in which we use it. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of important ways in which reality differs from the 
simple model, so it is useful to consider at least some basic extensions. For example, 
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after some years of marriage the husband will usually have information on his wives’ 
fertility. It suggests the more appropriate maximand is,  
)()()( 221121 rfrfrrYu    
Where αi represents the husband’s post-experience view of fertility. If resources are 
currently allocated to maximize this function and the allocation is on the concave part 
of the production functions, then a higher allocation is given to the more productive 














Where f’’ is the second derivative of f. If, for instance, the elasticity of f(r) is 
constant, then a higher incremental allocation of income will be given to the wife with 
the higher relative productivity. For instance, suppose that ( , / m )i i i iy n   where yi 
is the age of the ith wife and ni/mi is the number of children per year of marriage. We 
might expect that i  is increasing in ni/mi and decreasing in yi (Bongaarts and 
Casterline, 2013), in which case at the margin resources will be steered towards wives 
who are a) younger and b) have had more children per year of marriage.  
Though this is not a feature of the basic model, the allocation of resources might 
also depend on the bargaining power of wives. Divorce is common in many 
polygynous societies, including our target site (see below) and it is often initiated by 
women (Jackson, 1993). Whether this gives relatively more power to senior or junior 
wives is not obvious. Women only usually retain custody of young children, 
suggesting that it is older women who have most to lose from divorce, but divorce can 
be emotionally and financially disruptive when the bonds between partners are more 
numerous, making more salient the fear of divorce for a husband in a longer-
established family. The overall effects of these forces is unclear, but Izugbara and 
Ezeh, 2010, quote the view that “… in polygynous marriages in Islamic northern 
Nigeria, husbands allocate resources to their wives based on the number of children 
they have; the wife with the most children attracts the greatest proportion of his 
resources.” P. 200 ii 
These models and concepts relate allocations to demographic factors and measures 
of bargaining power. As such, they are squarely within traditional economic 
approaches to explanations of intra-household behavior. Non-economic explanations 
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of household allocation stress the power of social norms. In particular, in northern 
Nigeria the Koran provides a powerful guide to social behavior. Solivetti, 1994, 
attests that local interpretation of Koranic law in northern Nigeria favors equal 
treatment of wivesiii. However, Ware, 1979 reporting on polygyny elsewhere in 
Nigeria finds a perceived norm of preferential treatment for senior wives in the 
opinions of her small sample of married subjects. 
2.1 Locational Background 
Nigeria is one of a significant number of countries where polygyny is common and 
apparently stable in the sense that it has shown but a slow and erratic tendency to 
decline in the modern era. According to the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey, iv 
44.1% of married women in the largely Muslim North-west region of Nigeria (where 
our study is located) reported having one or more co-wives (National Population 
Commission and ICF International, 2014). This compares to 41.9% in the 2008 
survey and 37.2% in 1999.  Conversely, 25.6% of married husbands reported two or 
more wives in the same region. For husbands, this compares to 24.2% reported for the 
same region in a 1999 survey and 27.1% in 2008. In other words, there is no sign that 
in the north-west (and some other northern regions) that polygyny is on the wane. 
Polygyny is more common in rural areas by about sixteen percentage points, more 
common amongst lower educated individuals and common at all wealth levels. In the 
vast majority of polygynous marriages, two wives are married to one man, but 
nationally 2.6% of married women in 2013 reported having two or more co-wives.  
Within Nigeria, marriage practices differ by religion, region and ethnic group. Our 
sample is drawn from the Hausa people, the largest ethnic group in the north of 
Nigeria who also live in significant numbers in neighboring countries such as Niger. 
Hausa are Muslims and practice female seclusion as a cultural norm for married 
women (Hill, 1969). Hausa is a patrilineal society and one patrilocal extended family 
normally occupies a single compound with separate dwellings for each wife. Married 
women often do not go out in daylight except for occasions such as marriage 
ceremonies or to seek medical help (Calloway, 1984, Robson 2004). Among the 
Hausa, the reality of female seclusion varies with the nature of the settlement and the 
prosperity of the family. In general, it is more complete in urban areas and amongst 
higher income families (Calloway, 1984). In dispersed settlements, away from the 
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main towns, there can be relatively little seclusion.  Although seclusion limits their 
physical mobility, women have a significant degree of economic autonomy. They 
engage in various small-scale enterprises and many are highly active producers and 
traders of craft and food products. In this regard, children act as intermediaries with 
girls to the fore, hawking goods, passing messages and learning the skills of the 
marketplace. Robson, 2004, reports that girls spend twice as much time per week on 
trading as they do on domestic work and four times as much time as boys do.  
Within the region, population density is relatively high and most farming is 
intensive. Crops include wheat, rice, millet, sorghum, maize, cowpeas and 
groundnuts, but there is also some livestock farming and horticulture. However, the 
practice of seclusion means that while they engage heavily in agricultural processing 
activities for their own profit, married Hausa women play little role in cultivation, 
which is carried out largely by men with the aid of children (Hill, 1969; Jackson, 
1985).v What money wives earn is usually for themselves, accounts are kept strictly 
separately from their partners and spent according to their own priorities. “In Kano 
[the main city of the region], a woman's trade is so individual that a husband will 
actually buy prepared food from his wife for his meals.” Calloway, 1984, p. 440.  
Meanwhile men are responsible for providing normal consumption goods, housing 
and investing in agriculture. Divorce is relatively common and frequently initiated by 
women (in 86% of cases according to Solivetti, 1994). Jackson, 1993, reports a 
lifetime average of 2.3 marriages per woman amongst Hausa, while Calloway, 1984, 
concludes that around 50% of women will at some stage in their lives go through the 
process of divorce, emphasizing that remarriage is the overwhelming norm for pre-
menopausal women and occurs rapidly because most women who would otherwise 
face social isolation. Overwhelmingly, in the survey that accompanies our 
experiment, both men and women state that, upon divorce men and women typically 
retain their own property, including land, livestock, tools, cash and housing. Older 
boys and girls usually go with fathers, while younger children, especially girls, are 
more likely to go with mothers.  
III. Design 
To test efficiency and to examine male allocation within polygyny, we have two 
relevant treatments based upon a simple public good game (see Table 1 for a 
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summary). We conduct the experiment on both polygynous and monogamous 
households, though obviously we do not have random assignment to these categories. 
This creates a 2x2 design with each household playing one variant of the game (i.e. 
this is a between subjects experiment). 
Table 1 here. 
The first treatment can be thought of as a benchmark. In treatment 1, each subject, i, 
separately and privately receives an endowment of Ei = 400 Nairas(approximately 
$2.7 in 2010 which is approximately 1.9 days of per capita expenditure in this region 
using the estimates of household expenditure for our survey). Each person then 
chooses an investment, xi from the set {0, 100, 200, 300, 400}. The investments of the 
spouses are summed and multiplied by 1.5 and then each receives an equal fraction of 
the total together with any money that he or she has not invested. In the second 
treatment each subject separately and privately receives the same 400 Nairas as in 
treatment 1 and makes an investment decision from the same choice set. The 
investments are summed and multiplied in the same manner, but then the husband 
chooses how much to allocate to each person in the household. The husband’s 
decision is made using the strategy method – i.e., after he has made his investment 
decision, he must propose a binding allocation of payouts for possible investments by 
his wife. The monetary payoff for a participant is then the sum of the money allocated 
by the husband plus any money the person kept back from the investment.  
There is an issue in voluntary contribution games about the best way to compare 
games with different numbers of players. Consider a game where rewards are linear in 
investments and the common pool is split equally between n players. Suppose that the 
per person endowment is E(n), and the multiplier for total contributions is m(n). Thus 
if no-one contributes, per person payoffs are A(n) = E(n) and if everyone contributes 
all of her or his endowment the per person payoff is B(n) = E(n).m(n). In this case, the 
private marginal return on investment is c(n) = m(n)/n. It follows that B = nAc, so that 
not all of A, B and c can be independent of n. If c and B are constant then A = 
(1/n)(B/c) so that A must fall inversely with n. Similarly if A and c are constant then 
B must be proportional to n. We took the view that it was most important that, if 
everyone were completely selfish, each person would end up with the same payoff 
independently of household size and secondly if the household were unitary, payoff 
per person would be independent of household size. This dictates that we keep 
constant the endowment per person across conjugal types and we keep constant m 
 - 9 - 
(=1.5). So, the private marginal return, c = 0.5 in a 3 person game, compared to 0.75 
in the two person game.vi  
The private endowment Ei was known only to individual i, whereas the common 
account and the final allocation from that account was common knowledge. We told 
participants that, 
The exact amount will vary between people, but you will receive something 
between 0 and 400 Nairas. [Show the envelope.] Your husband will receive a 
similar envelope and he will receive an amount of money between 0 and 400 
Nairas. He does not know how much you have in your envelope and you 
won’t be told how much he has in his envelope. (Instruction for a wife in the 
monogamy case). 
As we stated above, in fact within the sub-sample of households in this paper all 
subjects received exactly 400 Naira. Other monogamous couples were also partaking 
in the same sessions, in treatments where endowments did differ from 400. As a 
result, in a typical session about 26% of subjects had endowments other than 400. Our 
choice of vagueness about the partner’s endowment is designed to mimic the typical 
household situation, in line with Iversen et al, 2011. Asymmetric information about 
individual resources and spending is a familiar part of household behavior in many 
cultures, including the Hausa (Calloway, 1984). Our follow-up survey amongst 
participants confirms this. This instruction was also chosen for ethical reasons, to 
avoid potential household conflict after the games. It allows an element of plausible 
deniability for subjects who do not contribute everything to the common pool.  
It is worthwhile stressing that in this experiment the total surplus maximizer has no 
incentive to withhold contributions, even with asymmetric information, but of course 
players with different motives may wish to hide some or all of their endowment from 
their partner. Here this could be achieved by not placing some of the endowment in 
the common pool, but because there are other motives for not investing which apply 
even if endowments are common knowledge, we cannot interpret all failures to invest 
as evidence of deceit. The clearest evidence of attempts to conceal resources is 
provided when the potential investor also controls the allocation (i.e. the husband in 
treatment 2).  
In the case of the strategy method used in Treatment 2, for monogamous couples, 
each husband made five conditional allocations – one for each possible investment 
level by his wife. For polygynous couples we would need 25 conditional allocations.  
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Under the circumstances of the experiment, this was logistically impossible, so we 
selected a subset of 5 possible investment combinations. If one of these combinations 
matched the actual pattern of investment, then the conditional allocation was binding. 
If it did not match, we asked the husband to make an actual allocation once the true 
investment pattern was revealed to him. The husbands did not know the 5 
combinations before they made their investment choices. They were told, 
… you will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. You have 
to decide how much to give to each of your wives and how much to keep for 
yourself. In a moment we will give you some time to think about how much money 
you want to leave in your envelope. After you have made your decision, we will ask 
you some questions about how you want to divide the money in the common 
envelope between yourself and your wives. 
 
The experiments took place on five consecutive days in July 2009. The locations 
were five villages (i.e. one village per day) selected purposefully in the Kadawa, 
Garum Malam, Kura, Bunkura and Bebeji districts approximately 1-2 hours south of 
Kano city. The villages needed to be sufficiently large to generate a sub-sample of 80 
households, to be isolated from one another to avoid contamination, to be largely 
agricultural but still accessible within one day from Kano. An initial site selection and 
a second visit were made to draw up a census of households in each village including 
identifiers for the number of wives. Using a random number generator families were 
invited from this roster, with separate selection of the monogamous and polygynous 
households. For all households it was made clear that only if all spouses turned up 
could they be accepted. In the case of polygynous households, households with more 
than 2 wives were eliminated from consideration.  In the rare case of no-shows, we 
used the same random generator to find a reserve family.  
The actual villages were between 4 and 10 km from the next nearest site. Their size 
was typically 200-300 households and the villages were highly homogeneous in terms 
of ethnicity and language spoken (Hausa) and religion. Approximately 10-15% of 
households fitted our requirements for the polygyny sub-sample. Given the state of 
the roads and our rapid movement from site to site, we do not think that 
contamination between sites is an issue. Certainly we see no trend in the results over 5 
days. In four of the five locations, no suitable public building was available for the 
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experiments, so maize plantations were used instead with people sitting on the 
ground. In the fifth location, a village school was available for use.  
Our visit to a village consisted of a morning and an afternoon session on one day. 
Each session had different treatments to reduce the possibility of contamination. We 
alternated treatments across morning and afternoon across villages. In each session 
there was one polygynous sub-sample of 8 households and one relevant sub-sample of 
8 monogamous couples. In addition to these groups, there were other sub-samples of 
monogamous couples in the same session who were playing treatments that we do not 
discuss in this paper, because they have no comparator group of polygynous 
households. These treatments involved different rules for the allocation or different 
rules for the endowment and how it was generated. Within monogamous couples, 
assignment to treatment was random.  
The actual experimenters were 12 (6 female and 6 male) local researchers recruited 
through the advice of local partners from Bayero University, Kano.  Most of them had 
some background in Sociology or Economics. Some of them had experience with the 
implementation of household surveys. All of them spoke very good English. The 
experimenters received five days of training. The first day of training was used for 
explaining the principles of how to run experiments (what to do and what not to do 
with examples) and presenting all the treatments to be played in Nigeria. On days two 
and three, experimenters practiced in Hausa (and sometimes in English so that the 
foreign team leaders could understand). On day four we ran a pilot using a small 
sample of subjects.  The fifth day of training was used to give individual and 
collective feedback on the pilot, to explain the logistics for the game days and to 
distribute the material needed for the game days. The experiments used scripts 
translated into Hausa and then back-translated into English.   
After a very short initial briefing provided to all participants, secrecy was ensured 
by calling one household at a time and separating each person, with the husband 
going to one location with one researcher and each of the wives going separately to 
another location with other researchers.  We then briefed the subjects on the nature of 
the task (see appendix for the instructions) and they then faced three test questions to 
check understanding.vii For the investment decision, each spouse removed from their 
envelope what they wanted to keep for themselves, with the remainder left for the 
common account. A helper collected their envelopes and recorded the decisions. For 
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the allocation decision, the experimenter went through each conditional investment in 
turn and recorded the subject’s answers. 
IV. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 set out background information from the accompanying survey.viii 
Recall that there were 40 households in each cell of the design. This makes 160 men 
in total and 240 women. 
Table 2 here. 
The typical polygynous family is larger than its currentlyix monogamous 
counterpart, has a higher income and the husband is older. As measured by the 
number of radios, or other relatively frequently owned assets, polygynous husbands 
are also wealthier.x In our monogamous sample, around 20% of male subjects and 
10% of female subjects report having been married before. With spousal death 
(usually a wife) accounting for 30% of cases in which marriages ended, it suggests 
that our sample has relatively low divorce rates compared to the standard view of the 
region (e.g. in Jackson, 1993 or Calloway, 1984).  There is some evidence of a 
bimodal shape in the second wife ages: only 30 out of 220 monogamous marriages 
involve a wife who married at age 20 or over; only 7 (out of 80) first  marriages had 
the same status, whereas 23 out of 78 second marriages involved women who were at 
least aged 20. This would be consistent with  Last (1992) view of a mixed motive for 
second marriages, at least some of which were not for the purpose of producing 
children.  
When we asked polygynous spouses about cooperation and allocation practices 
differences emerged between husbands and wives, as documented in Table 3. Largely, 
spouses reported equal allocation of time and money to wives, but with some favoring 
of first wives in decision-making. First wives were less likely to claim a major say in 
decisions, compared to second wives’ perceptions of the first wives’ role. Conversely, 
first wives granted second wives a greater say in decision-making than second wives 
claimed was the reality.  
Table 3 here.  
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We also asked questions about cooperation, both generally and specifically. 
Answers were largely consistent between household partners: about 90% agreed that 
the wives cooperated most of the time, with the remainder stating that the wives 
cooperated sometimes (the remaining alternatives were rarely and never).  For 
specific tasks, namely for child-rearing, cooking, buying provisions and agriculture 
the percentages stating that wives cooperated most of the time were lower, but still 
always the majority response by all three spouses. Meanwhile, around 65% of 
husbands stated that they would not hide any part of a windfall from their wives. The 
percentage was very similar for women, across family types, but second wives were 
slightly more likely to state that they would hide all of a windfall (20.5%) compared 
to first wives (15%) and wives in monogamy (15%).  
We now turn to the experimental results, considering first the investment data. 
 
Result 1. Men and women rarely invest their full endowment. 
Table 4 sets out the mean investment levels in the common pool across the 
experiment at both the household and individual level. A basic feature is that, across 
all types of spouses in the different treatments and marriages, subjects rarely invest all 
of their endowments. Thirteen and eleven out of eighty men invest all their 
endowment in treatments 1 and 2 respectively. For women, the corresponding 
numbers are just one and two. In fact, the modal investment for women is 25% of the 
endowment and, overall, a majority of subjects invest half or less of their 
endowments. Consequently the mean investment rate overall is less than 50%. 
Though low, these figures are not out of line with similar games played in Uganda 
(Iversen et al, 2011), Ethiopia (Kebede et al, 2014) and India (Munro et al, 2014).  
Table 4 here. 
Result 2. Investment rates do not vary significantly between polygyny and 
monogamy. 
A second basic feature of this data is the lack of variation across treatments at the 
level of the household and the lack of variation across household types. Median tests 
accept the null hypotheses that rates of household investment are the same across 
treatments within marital groups and across marital groups within treatments. We do 
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not reject the null hypothesis that husbands and wives investment the same fraction in 
monogamy and polygyny. In other words, there is no evidence of an efficiency cost to 
polygyny even in the treatment where all investment funds are shared equally between 
all partners. It is also noticeable from the last row of the table, that there is no 
significant difference between the investment behavior of first and second wives in 
polygyny. 
Result 3. Husbands generally invest more than wives in both polygyny and 
monogamy. 
For men the modal investment is 50% of their endowment. As a result, we generally 
reject the null hypothesis of equal rates of investment between men and women, 
although the difference is not significant in treatment 1 for monogamous households.  
Table 5 shows mean payoffs, that is total rewards including any part of the 
endowment that is kept back by the spouse from the common pool. Recall that if all 
subjects invest no endowment, then the payoff is 400 Nairas per person, while if all 
endowments are given to the common pool and distributed equally, the result is 600 
Naira per person. 
Result 4.  In treatment 1, payoffs for polygynous wives are significantly higher than 
husband’s payoffs.  
Mean rewards cluster around the 500 Nairas per person mark. In treatment 1, 
polygynous husbands invest more than their monogamous counterparts and more than 
their wives. The equal split rule enacted for this treatment means that the rewards of 
their higher investment are shared around the family. As a result, the payoffs for 
polygynous wives are higher than husbands’ payoffs in treatment 1. 
Table 5 here. 
Result 5. In treatment 2, polygynous men earn significantly more than 
monogamous men and more than their wives. 
In table 5, the final column shows tests of equality of outcomes across treatments. 
Men do better in treatment 2 and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
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level for monogamous households and at the 1% level in polygyny. In addition, in 
treatment 2, polygynous husbands invest less than in treatment 1 and less than 
monogamous men. They also claim more from the eventual allocation and this gives 
them the greater reward compared to monogamous men. Table 5 uses the actual 
investment and allocation, but the result does not depend on whether we focus on the 
conditional allocations or the actual allocations. For instance, in the case where the 
wives conditionally invest 100, the mean payoff to the husband is 447 Naira under 
monogamy and 467 under polygyny (t-statistic 0.95, p=0.167); where wives 
conditionally invest 300, the mean payoffs are 616 and 714 (t-statistic, 5.29, p=0.000) 
and where wives are posited to invest 400, the mean payoffs would be 691 and 822 (t-
statistic, 3.91; p=0.000).   
However, for women the outcome in polygyny depends on whether they are first or 
second wives: 
Result 6. First wives in polygynous households do no worse than women in 
monogamy. 
Across both treatments there is no statistically significant difference in the payoffs 
to first wives compared to payoffs for monogamous wives.  
Result 7. Comparing treatments, it is second wives whose earnings are significantly 
lower when men control the allocation. 
In treatment 1, on average second wives take away 528 Nairas, but when husbands 
control the allocation they receive only 435 Nairas. For first wives treatment 2 
rewards are lower than treatment 1, but the gap between treatments is not so large. As 
a result, second wives earn significantly less than first wives in the treatment where 
husband allocate resources. 
Table 5 uses data on actual allocations. Table 6 uses the full set of strategy 
information and sets out the patterns of allocation in polygynous and monogamous 
households in treatment 2. In each cell in the section of the matrix dealing with 
polygyny, there are three entries, representing the allocation to the husband, to the 
first wife and to the second wife respectively. With the monogamy column the first of 
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the two entries is for the man and the second is for the wife. For polygynous families 
the rows and columns represent the first and second wife’s conjectured investment. 
For monogamy the rows show the wife’s conjectured investment level.  
 
Table 6 here.  
Result 8. For both monogamous and polygynous households, in all the conditional 
allocations, men take the largest share of the rewards. 
So, men take the lion’s share of the proceeds. As investment levels rise, rewards 
rise for all parties with some sharing of the rewards of greater investment. On the 
whole, first and second wives earn closely related amounts.  
Result 9. Within polygynous households, mean conditional allocations to second 
wives are always lower than allocations to first wives.  
Result 9 which can be seen by looking at the Wife 1 and Wife 2 columns of Table 
6, means that the second wife’s relative investment does not affect whether she comes 
out ahead in the allocation. Result 9 is particularly stark in the case where the second 
wife’s investment is four times that of the first. In fact in only one household was the 
second wife allocated more than the first in any actual allocation.xi  Out of the full set 
of conditional allocations there were 13 cases of higher allocations to second wives (4 
from the same household), compared to 62 cases of higher allocations to first wives 
and 125 equal shares. Thus there is neither equal allocation of resources between 
families nor are there greater transfers to wives with fewer children. xii 
Still considering treatment 2, for each wife we take the difference between her 
conditional allocation when she invests 100 and when she invests 400. In the case of 
polygyny, the other wife’s conditional investment is held constant at 100 Nairas. The 
results are reported in Table 7.  
 
Result 10. Under polygyny and male control of the allocation senior wives earn a 
higher marginal return than junior wives. 
Table 7 also shows that the marginal return to wives is lower under polygyny 
(though this is not so surprising given the design). It is though notable that wife 1 
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obtains a higher return than wife 2 even from wife 2’s marginal investment, though 
this difference is not significant. 
Table 7 here. 
Table 8 shows the final returns on investment for partners in the husband-controlled 
allocation. In other words for each woman we divide her actual allocation by her 
investment and then average across households. In a few cases, there is no investment, 
so this is omitted from the relevant sub-sample. For polygynous households we break 
the sub-sample down further, according to whether the first wife’s investment was 
higher than the second wife’s investment etc. A number of features are readily 
apparent from this table. First, male returns are higher than females for polygynous 
households. For monogamous households the male and female figures are almost the 
same. Secondly, within polygynous households, the returns to wife 1 are higher than 
returns for wife 2. However, this pattern of returns depends critically on relative 
investment levels. Recall the earlier statement that first wives are rarely allocated less, 
but that typically both wives are allocated similar amounts by the husband. In this 
situation, the wife who invests more than her co-wife faces reduced returns. Table 8 
shows this by breaking down the polygynous households according to which wife 
invested more. We can see that when the first wife invests less she does particularly 
well, relatively. Conversely, when a wife invests more her returns are attenuated by 
the equalizing nature of male allocation. This we summarize as: 
Result 11. In treatment 2, monogamous men earn the same rate of return as their 
wives, but polygynous men earn a higher rate of return than their wives. 
Table 8 here. 
4.1 Regression results. 
We noted above differing theories about investment and allocation rules in 
polygyny. In particular allocation may be related to past and future fertility as well as 
religious norms. In this section we use some of the other data from the accompanying 
survey to cast further light on behavior within the experiment.  
In Table 9, in all cases the dependent variable is the fraction of endowment 
invested. Since this value is censored at zero and 1, the models estimated are tobit. 
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The dependent variable is actually categorical but as we do not get qualitatively 
different results if we use OLS or ordered logit we report the results shown. For men 
there are 160 observations and for women there are 240 observations, but when we 
add additional controls, the sample size drops slightly due to missing values for some 
households. 
For the equation with additional controls, we try a large number of variables, very 
few of which have any explanatory power. The equations shown are representative, in 
that they include the few variables that have significant explanatory power across 
many specifications, along with some (insignificant) variables that might be expected 
to be correlated with investment. For male investment, the variable that stands out is 
female clothing share. Female clothing share is often used as an indicator of female 
bargaining power (e.g. Lundberg et al, 1988). Here men invest significantly less when 
more clothing expenditure is on adult women. For women there is a similar paucity of 
significant explanatory controls. There is some weak evidence that older women 
invest more and that higher rates of female land ownership are associated with higher 
investment. There is stronger evidence that higher male income is associated with 
higher levels of female investment, whereas when wives perceive their husbands to 
have more leisure (the alternatives are women have more and equal leisure), they are 
less likely to invest. Apart from the constant, there are no variables that are significant 
in both men and women’s equations.  
Table 9 here. 
We turn to the allocation data. For polygynous households in treatment 2, let yi i = 
h, w1, w2, be the allocation to the husband, senior wife and junior wife respectively. 
We are interested in estimating equations of the basic form: 
i i i i iy Z X      
Where X is a matrix of explanatory variables that can include features of the 
marriage, and household characteristics, while Z represents the investment levels of 
the 3 partners. The symbols α and β represent the corresponding parameter vectors 
and εs are error terms.  
The key issues are whether and why second wives are treated differently from first 
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wives. As discussed in section 2, the Bergstrom model predicts that wives will be 
treated equally. In the extended model referred to in the same discussion, the husband 
updates his priors on the fertility of the wives and channels resources towards the wife 
with the higher anticipated fertility. Alternatively, it may be that the being second 
itself directly affects the allocation. Another possibility is that the wives may have 
some bargaining power and this influences the allocation. Given this, for the 
additional controls, we select two groups of variables: fertility and wife’s age are 
chosen to reflect the extended Bergstrom model. The other group includes variables 
that are typically used as proxies for wives’ bargaining power (e.g. Kebede et al., 
2014): whether the wife’s mother is still alive; and the educational level of the wife. 
The final proxy for bargaining power is the presence of an older female child in the 
household since, as we noted, these daughters provide a valuable connection between 
secluded wives and the marketplace (Calloway, 1984, Robson 2004). Additionally we 
include male age and total household expenditure, since these are standard variables 
that may affect male generosity.  
A feature of the allocation data from treatment 2 is that about 40% (15/40) of 
polygynous husbands give equal shares to wives on all occasions. Figure 2 illustrates 
this point, showing the relative allocations of money, (yw1 - yw2), by polygynous 
husbands in all cases where wives had invested different amounts. There is a spike in 
the data at zero, a feature amplified if the data from all the allocation decisions is 
included. The difference in behavior between husbands suggests an underlying 
population that contains a mix of two types: equal splitters – defined as males who 
always set yw1 = yw2 in our experiment - and husbands who tend to favor the first 
wife, but more generally, associate relative allocations (yw1 - yw2) to investment levels 
and other factors.  We begin by investigating whether there are factors that can predict 
whether a husband is an equal splitter. 
Figure 2 here. 
 Table 10 reports a probit model in which the dependent variable takes the value 1 if 
the husbands are equal splitters and zero otherwise.  The sample size is given by the 
number of polygynous households in treatment 2 less two because of missing data. 
The explanatory power of this model is limited (though it correctly predicts 79% of 
outcomes), but it suggests that higher household resources are not associated with a 
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higher probability of splitting the investment equally. The only variables significantly 
linked to being an equal splitter are male age (positively linked) and the difference in 
female age (negatively linked), although this second factor is only significant at the 
10% level.  
Table 10 here. 
Let us now turn to the actual allocation using the husbands who are not equal 
splitters. In polygyny, the husband must split the allocation between 3 partners, but 
given total investment, two allocation decisions (e.g. to husband and first wife), must 
determine the third.  To focus further on the relative treatment of the wives we 
estimate the following pair of equations for Table 11: 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
w w w w








Since it is possible that the error terms in the equations are correlated, we therefore 
use a seemingly unrelated (SUR) one-way random effects model for an unbalanced 
panel (Biorn, 2004).xiii For each of the 25 households there are 5 conditional 
allocations making 125 observations, but in the case of some households the actual 
investment by the wives did not match one of the conditional cases. Thus, there are 
households with 6 observations making the panel unbalanced and giving 141 
observations in total.  
Table 11 here. 
The first thing to note about the results is that we accept the null hypothesis that 
the error terms in the two equations are not correlated. The row marked 
‘independence test probability’ towards the bottom of the table shows the p-value of 
the results of a test of independence. In other words, little is gained by using the SUR 
approach. More to the point, it suggests that once the covariates are taken into 
account, the generosity of the husband towards each of the two wives is not 
correlated. The first two equations in Table 11 omit additional controls. The results 
reflect the fact that husbands take the major share of any marginal investment and also 
treat wives unequally. Essentially, second wives start nearly 60 Naira behind first 
wives in the allocation and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Meanwhile, the coefficients on investments are small, given that the sum of marginal 
returns to a person’s investment must add up to 1.5. Beyond this key point, we see 
that the allocation to the wives is sensitive to their own investment and that made by 
the husband, but also to the investment of their co-wives. The marginal allocation to 
each wife is higher out of her own contribution, compared to the allocation to the 
other wife. The coefficients are almost symmetric, suggesting that at the margin the 
husbands do not favor one wife over the other. In the next two columns we use data 
only from the original five questions of the strategy method (and not the sixth 
question which was asked if the wives’ actual investment pattern did not match the 
hypothetical pattern). We see that the results are not sensitive to this feature.  
Adding the additional controls makes some difference to the coefficients on the 
investment variables, but does not alter the basic conclusion.xiv As for the additional 
control variables, it is worth re-emphasizing that this is a small sample and we should 
be wary of drawing general conclusions, but that aside three points stand out. First, 
older husbands are more generous, both to first and to second wives. Second, the 
variables that were given a justification based on bargaining power play no significant 
role in explaining the data, either individual or collectively. Third – and in contrast to 
the previous point – the ‘extended Bergstrom’ variables do play a role.  We report this 
as: 
Result 12. Both first and second wives are allocated more if they have higher 
historical fertility within the marriage and less if they are older. 
Additionally, the coefficients on these variables do not differ significantly between 
the wives (p=0.45 and p=0.85 respectively for tests on the equality of the wife’s age 
and fertility coefficients). Nevertheless, the fact that the second wife is typically 
younger than the first wife is not sufficient to overcome the basic tendency of the 
husband to steer relatively more resources to the senior wife. For example, when all 
other variables are at their mean values, a first wife would have to be 20 years older 
than the second for the predicted allocations to be equal. Alternatively, her fertility 
would have to be 0.05 children per year of marriage (compared to the actual mean of 
0.27) for equal predicted allocation. 
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V. Conclusions. 
Polygynous households are a significant building block of many societies, yet 
evidence of their economic functioning is scarce. We run an experiment with 
polygynous and monogamous households in the north of Nigeria and gather survey 
data on their economic and marital circumstances. In both types of families, spouses 
rarely invest all their endowments into a common fund. In fact the most common 
decisions are to invest either half of the endowment or just one quarter. As a result, 
mean levels of investment are low (and low compared to most other locations in 
which we have run similar experiments). A key feature of the data though, is the 
similarity of behavior by spouses in monogamous and polygynous families: as 
measured by the percentage of total endowment invested into a common pool, there is 
no efficiency loss with polygamy and no efficiency gain either.   
Compared to the situation where the common pool is automatically split evenly 
amongst participants, male control of the allocation yields higher male investment in 
monogamy, but lower investment under polygyny. For polygynous women 
investment is lower in the male control treatment and overall investment levels remain 
low. Thus, in keeping with much of the survey-based evidence on intra-household 
allocation in West Africa, our results are therefore incompatible with simple models 
that assume household efficiency.  
If the household is non-cooperative, then some part of the failure to achieve an 
efficient outcome may be due to risk aversion. If the household is non-cooperative 
then a player may view the investment as risky since she or he may not see the 
benefits of their contribution. Even then, risk aversion alone cannot be used to explain 
male behavior in treatment 2. Since a husband can always keep any investment that he 
makes there is no risk in investing all of his endowment. Yet few husbands do this, 
despite demonstrating understanding the mechanics of the game when tested. 
Possibly, subjects do not wish to place money in a joint envelope that can be 
bargained over even after the experiment is over. If that is the case then risk aversion 
can also play a part in their behavior if they are unsure about how ex-post bargaining 
might play out.  
Our experimental results on polygyny are also incompatible with theories such as 
the basic Bergstrom model in which there is always equal allocation to the wives. 
Instead, we have evidence of a mixture of households. In some families, rules of equal 
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splitting seem to be followed, though even here, the lower investment made by senior 
wives mean they have a higher average rate of return. Amongst families where equal 
splitting rules are not followed, senior wives have a higher marginal and average rate 
of return. For these households there is some evidence of a generalized Bergstrom 
model in the sense that husbands tend to favor wives who are younger and who have 
higher fertility. This evidence of a mix of households may help reconcile the 
fragments of geographically scattered yet contradictory evidence on intra-household 
resource allocation that are available for polygyny. For instance in an early study of 
Hausa, Barkow, 1972, writes, “A gift to one wife means a gift to all wives and the 
gifts must be of equal value” p. 322, whereas Leroy et al, 2007, conclude that children 
of first wives in northern Ghana fare better nutritionally, than their half-siblings. 
Meanwhile in results that come closest to mirroring ours, Gibson and Maice, 2006, 
find that controlling for age and other variables, first wives have a higher body mass 
index (BMI) compared to monogamous women and second wives (who rank last) 
amongst agro-pastoralists in rural Ethiopia (see also Wagner and Rieger, 2015) . 
For the households where the allocation is sensitive to seniority, it seems that both 
the historical fertility of the wife and her age plays a role in affecting the allocation, 
though not to the extent that the basic precedence of the first wife is threatened. Our 
household survey evidence suggests that many households are aware of seniority 
rules, and there is a corroborating theme running through some of the ethnographic 
research on local patterns of conjugality.xv For instance, Smith, (1971) in describing 
the Hausa conjugal contract includes the obligation to ‘obey his chief wife’ (1971: 60) 
while Cohen, (1971) concludes,  
‘a senior wife is the most authoritative figure among the wives, and faced 
with one junior wife, the superior position of the senior tends to make her the 
winner more often than the loser in any competitive struggles that ensue.’ 
(Cohen: 143-4). 
What is the value of a seniority rule, why is it stable? We cannot answer that wider 
question within our experiment, but a number of quite different theories are 
potentially consistent with the practice. Older wives may have more power, but our 
data does not supply any evidence that this power derives from ‘standard’ economic 
power variables, such as income or separately owned assets or ready access to the 
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maternal family. It is entirely possible that wives acquire a greater understanding of 
how to bargain successfully in the marriage or that a norm is enforced through some 
kinds of community-enforcement. Alternatively, a longer-lasting marriage may 
produce more sentiment on the part of the husband, but the role of such factors 
requires further research.  
While the forces that determine the relevant treatment of the wives remain unclear, 
one factor emerges clearly from the male control treatment:  the allocation of the 
common pool made by men favors first wives over their juniors, but above all it 
favors men, who are the only partners who consistently earn a rate of return above the 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF DESIGN. 
  Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
 Endowment 400 Naira /person 400 Naira /person 
Monogamy Investment 0, 100, 200, 300 or 400 0, 100, 200, 300 or 400 
 Common Pool Rule Investments x 1.5 Investments x 1.5 
 Allocation Rule 50:50 By husband 
 Sample 40 households 40 households 
 Endowment 400 Naira /person 400 Naira /person 
Polygyny Investment 0, 100, 200, 300 or 400 0, 100, 200, 300 or 400 
 Common Pool Rule Investments x 1.5 Investments x 1.5 
 Allocation Rule 50:50 By husband 





















Monogamy 5.9 3.2 16 26 36.7 126,014 
Polygyny 10.7 5.1   42.0 203,717 
First marriage  6.5 3.4 15 23   
Second marriage 4.1 1.8 18 32   
















TABLE 3. PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD PRACTICES. 
 







have about the 
same  
Second wife 
has more say 
Neither wife 
is involved  
Other, 
specify  
Husband 40.0 43.8 8.8 6.8 1.3 
First Wife 24.1 50.6 20.3 5.1 0 
Second wife 34.6 52.6 6.4 6.4 0 
How husband splits 











Husband 10.0 6.3 83.8 0.0 0.0 
First Wife 1.3 5.1 84.8 8.9 0.0 
Second wife 1.3 2.6 96.2 0.0 0.0 
How husband splits 
money between wives 
(%) 
All to first 
wife 
75% to first 
wife  
Half to each 
wife 
25% to first 
wife 




Husband 10 11.3 73.8 0 0 5 
First Wife 2.5 8.9 84.8 3.8 0 0 




TABLE 4 MEAN INVESTMENT LEVELS AS A FRACTION OF ENDOWMENT.  
  Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Median test, 
treatments p-value 
Overall     
Monogamy  0.459 0.503 0.311 
Polygyny  0.500 0.469 0.106 
Husbands     
Monogamy  0.486 0.565 0.069 
Polygyny  0.594 0.513 0.043 
Median test within treatment, husbands, p-
value 
 0.043 0.069  
Wives     
Monogamy  0.431 0.444 0.644 
Polygyny  0.453 0.447 0.412 
Polygyny, Wife 1  0.475 0.425 0.085 
Polygyny, Wife 2  0.431 0.469 0.644 
Paired test, husbands and  wives, monogamy  0.202 0.041  
Paired test, husbands and  1st  wives, polygyny  0.022 0.026  
Paired test, husbands and  2nd wives, polygyny  0.018 0.222  
Paired test, wives, polygyny  0.300 0.478  
Notes: All non-paired tests are tests of medians. Paired tests are signed rank tests. Results are 





TABLE 5. PAYOFFS  (NAIRAS). 
  Treatment 
1 
Treatment 2 Treatment 
difference  
Overall (per person)     
Monogamy  491.9 500.7  
Polygyny  500.0 496.3  
Husbands     
Monogamy  480.6 518.8 0.037 
Polygyny  462.5 572.5 0.000 
Median test, p-value, husbands  0.372 0.044  
Wives     
Monogamy  503.1 482.5 0.222 
Polygyny, Wife 1  510.0 481.3 0.027 
Polygyny, Wife 2  527.5 435.0 0.073 
Paired test, husbands and  wives, 
monogamy 
 0.202 0.240  
Paired test, husbands and  1st  wives, 
polygyny 
 0.020 0.002  
Paired test, husbands and  2nd wives, 
polygyny 
 0.014 0.000  
Paired test, wives, polygyny  0.302 0.042  
Wives,  monogamy versus first wives in 
polygyny 
 0.820 0.780  
Notes: All non-paired tests are tests of medians. Paired tests are signed rank tests. Results are 
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TABLE 7 MARGINAL RETURNS. 
 N Wife 1’s investment Wife 2’s investment 
Polygyny 
Return to wife 1 40 0.433 0.432 
Return to wife 2 40 0.317 0.382 
Return to husband  40 0.742 0.683 
Monogamy: 
Return to wife 40 0.690 - 
Return to husband 40 0.810 - 
Note: table shows mean marginal return from investment of 1 more Naira. Thus within each 




TABLE 8 RETURNS ON ACTUAL INVESTMENT 
 Polygynous Monogamous 
 ΔI > 0 ΔI ≥ 0 ΔI = 0 ΔI < 0 All  
Wife 1 1.0 1.39 1.57 2.36 (9) 1.62(38) 1.62 
Wife 2 1.75(8) 1.46(28) 1.34 0.87 1.29(39) - 
Husband 2.05 1.88 1.79 2.52 2.02 1.61(37) 
N 9 29 20 11 40 40 
ΔI = wife 1’s investment – wife 2’s investment.  In each column, the sub-sample size is usually 
equal to the value of N; exceptions are shown in parentheses and represent cases where the wife or 





TABLE 9 TOBIT MODELS OF FRACTION OF ENDOWMENT INVESTED. 
 Male Male, 
Additional 
Controls 
Female  Female, 
Additional 
Controls 
Constant 0.501*** 0.555*** 0.423*** 0.337** 
 (0.058) (0.102) (0.107) (0.147) 
Male control dummy 0.078 -0.032 0.015 0.034 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.042) (0.049) 
Polygynous 0.117 0.052 0.027 0.022 
 (0.099) (0.127) (0.077) (0.069) 
Male control x Polygynous -0.170 -0.031 -0.019 -0.055 
 (0.123) (0.113) (0.056) (0.050) 
Second wife   0.008 0.017 
   (0.093) (0.100) 
Male has more leisure (own view)  0.018  -0.067*** 
  (0.064)  (0.021) 
Female clothing share  -2.848**  0.204 
  (1.190)  (0.468) 
Children  0.011  0.003 
  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Age, Husband  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Age, Wife  -0.000  0.002* 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Does wife own land in own name?  0.032  0.051* 
  (0.035)  (0.028) 
Husband’s income x 100,000  0.014  0.025*** 
  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Wife’s income x 100,000  0.026  -0.012 
  (0.066)  (0.017) 
Wife has no education  -0.063  -0.024 
  (0.061)  (0.040) 
Years married  0.002  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Observations 160 147 240 214 
Invest nothing 6 6 7 6 
Invest all 24 21 12 11 
LR chi-squared value 3.32 22.88 0.11 2.36 
Prob 0.33 0.01 0.94 0.009 
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses under the estimated 
coefficient. *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10. 
Female clothing share is the share of total clothing expenditure spent on adult females.  
The LR chi-squared value is for a test that the equation has a whole has no explanatory 
power. The corresponding p-value is entered beneath it.  
To make the coefficients easier to display, the income coefficients have been multiplied 





TABLE 10 EQUAL SPLITTERS 
  Probit 
Variable Equal splitter =1 
Constant -2.758*** 
 (0.898) 
Expenditure / 100,000 0.007 
 (0.005) 
Male age 0.057** 
 (0.026) 
Difference, fertility 1.236 
 (1.611) 
Difference, older girl -0.899 
 (0.836) 
Difference, female no education -0.219 
 (0.297) 
Difference, wife age -0.048* 
 (0.029) 
Difference, mother alive -0.971 
 (0.692) 
N 38 
Notes.  Equal splitter = 1 if husband always gives wives equal shares of the allocation, 0 
otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. Independent 
variables based on husband’s answers. Difference always refers to wife1 – wife2 







 TABLE 11 RANDOM EFFECT SUR ESTIMATION ON POLYGYNOUS HUSBAND’S ALLOCATION 
Variable No additional 
controls 
No additional 
controls (5 questions) 
With additional controls 
 First wife Second 
wife 
First wife Second 
wife 
First wife Second wife 
Constant 62.619**  -6.325    62.119** 7.379 -37.217    -5.148    
 (22.750)    (17.974)    (28.122) (37.681) (52.577)    (34.642)    
Male investment 0.120    0.308*** 0.109 0.195 0.264*** -0.297    
 (0.095)    (0.076)    (0.125) (0.175) (0.089)    (0.180)    
Wife 1 investment 0.529*** 0.338*** 0.480*** 0.360*** 0.508*** 0.362*** 
 (0.036)    (0.029)    (0.037) (0.041) (0.030)    (0.038)    
Wife 2 investment 0.386*** 0.581*** 0.393*** 0.540*** 0.391*** 0.573*** 
 (0.036)    (0.029)    (0.037) (0.041) (0.030)    (0.038)    
Expenditure/ 100,000     0.009    0.073    
     (0.127)    (0.194)    
Husband’s age     2.893**  3.528*** 
     (1.325)    (1.183)    
Girl>5 dummy      1.320    27.416    
     (9.601)    (26.853)    
Wife’s mother is alive     -15.647    0.855    
     (14.493)    (16.298)    
No female education     -8.990    38.078    
     (17.032)    (28.580)    
Wife’s fertility     130.171**  143.365*** 
     (64.284)    (33.125)    
Wife’s age     -2.245**  -1.334*   
     (0.924) (0.782)   
Independence test 
probability 
 0.91 0.53 0.45 
N  141 125 130 
No. groups  25 25 23 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Independence test probability  reported is for a 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence between the equations (1 d.f.). *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 
0.05; * = p < 0.10.’No additional controls (5 questions) means only the original 5 strategy 








Appendix. English language version of the instructions for the Male 
control treatment. 
 
Instructions for Participants 
 
[General introduction: To be read at the beginning of ALL investment 
treatments and sessions. Prior to the experiment you will need to make or buy 
colored cards for each participant. Say Blue for men and Yellow and Red for 
women. On entering the venue each man receives a Blue card. Within each 
household one wife gets Yellow and one wife gets Red. The allocation is 
random.  
Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce 
EXPERIMENTERS and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions 
during today’s programme. 
We have invited you here because we want to learn about how married 
couples in this area take decisions. We will ask you to make decisions about 
money. Whatever money you win today will be yours to keep. 
What you need to do will be explained fully in a few minutes. But first we 
want to make a couple of things clear. 
 First of all, this is not our money. We belong to a research 
organization, and this money has been given to us for research. 
 Second, this is a study about how you make decisions. Therefore 
you should not talk with others. This is very important. Please be 
sure to obey this rule because it is possible for one person to spoil 
the activity for everyone. I’m afraid that if we find you talking with 
others, we will have to send you home, and you will not be able to 
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earn any money here today. Of course, if you have questions, you 
can ask one of us. 
 Third, the study has two parts: today’s exercise is one, but we will 
also visit you in your homes in the coming weeks to ask both the 
husband and the wives a number of questions. 
 Finally, make sure that you listen carefully to us. You will be able 
to make a good amount of money here today, and it is important 
that the instructions are clear for you so that you can follow them. 
 Does everyone in the room have a colored card (check)? 
Would wives with red cards now please go with [Thea] and wives with 
yellow cards please go with [Thelma] and husbands with [Theo]? The task 
will then be explained to you. [You need to be careful that each room now 
contains only 1 person from each household] 
 
[Instructions for each wife] 
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact 
amount will vary between people, but you will receive something between 0 
and 400 nairas. [Show the envelope.] Your husband will receive a similar 
envelope and he will also receive an amount of money between 0 and 400 
Nairas. He doesn’t know how much you have in your envelope and you won’t 
be told how much he has in his envelope. The other wife (sister?) will also 
receive a similar envelope with some amount of money between 0 and 400 
Nairas. Again she won’t know how much you have or how much your 
husband has. None of you will know what the others have. 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how 
much to leave in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. 
Your husband and sister wife will be making the same decision with their 
envelopes. You can only take nothing, 100, 200, 300 or 400 Nairas out of the 
envelope. Other amounts are not allowed. So please remember: you can only 
take nothing, 100, 200, 300 or 400 Nairas out. 
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After you have made your decision and your husband and your sister have 
made their decisions we will bring you together again. We will put all the 
money that you and you all have left in your envelopes into one envelope. We 
call it, the common envelope. To whatever is in the common envelope we will 
add another half again. So, if there are 200 Nairas in the common envelope we 
will add another 100 Nairas to make the total 300. If there are 800 Nairas in 
the common envelope we will add another 400 Nairas to make a total of 1200 
Nairas and so on.  
Each of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope.  
After that your husband will decide how to split the money in the common 
envelope. He has to decide how much to give to you, how much to give to 
your sister and how much to keep for herself. In a moment we will give you 
some time to think about how much money you want to leave in your 
envelope.  
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the 
instructions. 
1. If you have 400 Nairas in your envelope and you take out 200 Nairas 
how much will be left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct 
participant if necessary] 
2. If you each put 200 Nairas into the common envelope how much will 
there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is 400 Nairas in the common envelope?    
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary] 
[Responses to common questions: to be used only when subjects ask] 
1. If you are asked whether the husband and wives will have the same 
amounts in their envelopes, answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your 
decision and I am not allowed to offer advice’ 
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3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them 
precisely. E.g. if I put in 400 Nairas and my husband and sister puts in 
nothing how much will you add to the total?’ Answer: 200 Nairas. 
[Once the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the 
activity, give him/her some time to make his/her decision in private. DON’T 
FORGET TO KEEP RECORD OF THIS DECISION. YOU NEED TO 
TRANSFER THIS INFORMATION TO THE EXPERIMENTER WORKING 
WITH THE HUSBAND.] 
 
1. If your husband had 400 Nairas in his envelope, how much do you think 
he would take out? 
Thank you. We will now rejoin your husband and sister and put the money 
from your two envelopes into the common envelope.  
[Bring husband and wives together & resolve the game.] 
[Experimenter looks up the allocation decision and executes it. Subjects are 
given their money and thanked] 
 
[Instructions for husbands, polygynous case] 
In a moment I will give you an envelope containing money. The exact 
amount will vary between people, but you will receive something between 0 
and 400 Nairas. [Show the envelope.] Your wives will each receive a similar 
envelope and they will each receive an amount of money between 0 and 400 
Nairas. They don’t know how much you have in your envelope and you won’t 
be told how much they have in their envelopes. None of you will know what 
the others have. 
You have to decide how much money to take out of the envelope and how 
much to leave in. Any money you take out of the envelope is yours to keep. 
Your wives will be making the same decision with their envelope. You can 
only take nothing, 100, 200, 300 or 400 Nairas out of the envelope. Other 
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amounts are not allowed. So please remember: you can only take nothing, 100, 
200, 300 or 400 Nairas out. 
After you have made your decision and your wives have made their 
decisions we will bring you together again. We will put all the money that you 
and your wives have left in your envelopes into one envelope. We call it, the 
common envelope. To whatever is in the common envelope we will add 
another half again. So, if there are 200 Nairas in the common envelope we will 
add another 100 Nairas to make the total 300. If there are 320 Nairas in the 
common envelope we will add another 400 Nairas to make a total of 480 
Nairas and so on.  
All of you will know the total amount of money in the common envelope 
and who put it in.  
After that you will decide how to split the money in the common envelope. 
You have to decide how much to give to each of your wives and how much to 
keep for yourself. 
In a moment we will give you some time to think about how much money 
you want to leave in your envelope. After you have made your decision, we 
will ask you some questions about how you want to divide the money in the 
common envelope between yourself and your wives. 
Let me ask some questions to check whether you understood the 
instructions. 
1. If you have 400 Nairas in your envelope and you take out 200 Nairas 
how much will be left in the envelope? [record the answer, correct 
participant if necessary] 
2. If you each put 200 Nairas into the common envelope how much will 
there be in total (before we add anything)? 
3. How much we will add if there is 400 Nairas in the common envelope?  
[Record each answer, correct participant if necessary] 
[Responses to common questions: to be used only when subjects ask] 
 
 44 
1. If you are asked whether the spouses will have the same amounts in 
their envelopes, answer: possibly, possibly not. 
2. If you are asked what ‘what should I do’, you should say that it is ‘your 
decision and I am not allowed to offer advice’ 
3. If you are asked precise arithmetical questions then answer them 
precisely. E.g. if I put in 400 Nairas and my wives puts in nothing how 
much will you add to the total?’ Answer: 200 Nairas. 
[Once the experimenter is sure that the participant has understood the 
activity, give him/her some time to make his/her decision in private. DON’T 
FORGET TO KEEP RECORD OF THIS DECISION.] 
[Continuation of instructions for husbands. You need to quietly receive the 
actual amounts left in their envelopes by the Red and Yellow wives. Put these 
amounts into the question  below,.] 
You have left [Y] Nairas in the envelope. In a few minutes we will put all 
the money into one envelope, the common envelope.  
[For the questions which follow, read off the amounts from these tables.  
 
Amount added to common pool 
Y↓ Wives→ 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 
0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
100 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 
200 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 
300 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 








Total amount in the common pool 
Y↓ Wives→ 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 
0 0 150 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 
100 150 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 
200 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 
300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 1650 
400 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1500 1650 1800 
 
1. Your wife with the Red card has left RED Nairas in her envelope. 
Your wife with the Yellow card has left YELLOW Nairas in her 
envelope. We add [read off first table] Nairas to the [Total] Nairas that 
are already in the common envelope. There will then be [read off 
second table] Nairas in the common envelope.  
 [Making the decision.] 
You now have to decide how to split the money. You cannot change your 
mind later on.  
1. Your wife with the Red card has left RED Nairas in her envelope. 
Your wife with the Yellow card has left YELLOW Nairas in her 
envelope so that there is [read off second table] Nairas in the common 
envelope. How do you want to split the money?  How much for you 
[write down]; and how much for your wife with the Red card and how 
much for you wife with the Yellow card. [Write down & check sums]?  
[Review and change as is necessary] 
Thank you. We will now rejoin your wife and put the money from your two 
envelopes into the common envelope.  
[Bring husband and wives together & resolve the game.] 
[Experimenter looks up the allocation decision and executes it. Subjects are 
given their money and thanked] 
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* This study forms part of “The Intra-Household allocations of resources: Cross-
Cultural Tests, Methodological Innovations and Policy Implications”, a project jointly 
funded by the UK’s  ESRC and DFID (RES-167-25-0251). As such the work has 
benefited greatly at all stages from the expertise and close cooperation of the other 
members of the team, Professors Cecile Jackson and Nitya Rao. Alistair Munro’s 
work was also partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP25101002. 
We are also grateful for helpful comments received from Takashi Yamano, Yukichi 
Mano, seminar participants at FASID, Tokyo, Economic Science Association 
meeting, Melbourne, 2010, ASSA Meeting 2011 Denver, and the World Bank. We 
are especially thankful to the hard-working efforts of our local team, led by Kabiru 
Bello and Dr. Habu under the guidance of Dr Wakili, the director of the Centre for 
Democratic Research and Training in Kano.   
i This is a conservative figure drawn from various sources including, UN 
Population Division, 2000, Tertilt, 2005 and Demographic and Health Surveys. In 
approximately 30 countries, the percentage of married men with two or more wives 
exceeds 10%. In other 25 or so, the percentage is below 10% but above 5%. In some 
cases, the data is over 20 years old and therefore may be inaccurate. 
ii This may not be due to wives’ bargaining power, since the needs of children will 
depend typically on their age profile. As such, a husband may allocate resources 
differentially to ensure the maximum number of surviving children (Maluccio et al, 
2009, Ukwuani et al, 2002).  
 
iii The relevant passage is: "And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards 
orphans, then marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if 
you fear that you will not do justice (between them), then (marry) only one or what 
your right hands possess; this is more proper, that you may not deviate from the right 
course."  Koran, 4:3.  
 
iv 2013 Demographic and Health Surveys 
(http://www.measuredhs.com/statcompiler);  The sample size is 8723 men for the  
figures given here. 
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v Scattered through areas south of Kano there are villages for Maguzawa, a non-
Islamic group that does not practice wife seclusion, and who were sampled separately 
for our examination of monogamous couples. They are not included in this data set. 
vi Thus the game mimics a household with constant returns to scale, as if for 
instance the investment goes towards a joint food budget. If the game were supposed 
to mimic contributions to a pure household public good such as a communal light 
source or radio, then it would be more appropriate to allow C to be constant. 
vii Only two male subjects out of 160 and seven women out of 240 fail our checks 
of understanding.  
viii Six of the first marriages were levirate and 1 of the second marriages. 
ix Some monogamous families may become polygynous at a later date. Since this is 
not uncommon, men and women may anticipate it in their decision-making. 
x We have detailed information on ownership of a variety of assets. Some types 
(e.g. cars) are too infrequently held to be useful indicators of household wealth and 
some valuations (particularly for land holdings) are not credible. Typically though, 
measures of wealth are higher with polygynous households; patterns of radio 
ownership can be seen as a metonymy for this aspect of our data. 
xi Contrast this with the women interviewed in Calloway, 1984, who “… assert that 
men are not impartial, and that often disproportionate resources go to support younger 
wives and their children.” P. 404.  
xii  Senior wives have more children, so there is an implicit rejection of the 
hypothesis that the family with fewer children receives more, but the hypotheses can 
be rejected explicitly. In only 3 households does the husband have more children with 
the second wife.  So reanalyzing the data on the basis of relative household size does 
not change the conclusion.   
xiii There is also the issue of the potential endogeneity of male investment. Using 
the equation for husband’s allocation to self and the independent variables from Table 
9 as instruments we run a Hausman test, accepting the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity with a p-value of 0.933.  
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xiv The additional variables were selected on the basis that they can be linked to 
theories about how the allocation might be determined. We have tried incorporating a 
number of other variables but there is no robust evidence that other, omitted variables 
drive the allocation.  
 
xv Indeed, the translation of the term ‘uwar gida’ is ‘senior or only wife’ in 
Abraham’s, (1975), dictionary of the Hausa language. 
